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Executive Summary
Under Marbury v. Madison, it is “emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.” But as a matter of actual practice, statements
about “what the law is” are often made by the executive department, not the judiciary. In
the last quarter-century, the Supreme Court has legitimated the executive’s power of
interpretation, above all in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the most-cited
case in modern public law. Chevron reflects a salutary appreciation of the fact that the
executive is in the best position to make the judgments of policy and principle on which
resolution of statutory ambiguities often depends. But the theory that underlies Chevron
remains poorly understood, and in the last two decades, significant efforts have been
made to limit the executive’s interpretive authority. In general, these efforts should be
resisted. The principal qualification involves certain sensitive issues, most importantly
those involving constitutional rights. When such matters are involved, Congress should
be required to speak unambiguously; executive interpretation of statutory ambiguities is
not sufficient.

1
Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power To Say What the Law Is
Cass R. Sunstein
1. Introduction
Consider the following cases:
a. Under the administration of President Jimmy Carter, the Department of the
Interior adopted a broad definition of what it meant to “harm” a member of an
endangered species.1 The governing statute made it unlawful to “take” a
member of an endangered species, and it defined “take” to include “harass,
harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect.”2 The Interior
Department interpreted “harm” to include “significant habitat modification or
degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly
impairing essential behavioral functions, including breeding, feeding, or
sheltering.”3 The interpretation was challenged as inconsistent with the
statute. A majority of the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the Carter-era
regulation,4 over a dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas.5

b. Under the administration of President George W. Bush, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) rejected a petition to issue regulations to control the
emission of greenhouse gases from motor vehicles.6 The underlying statute
required the agency to regulate emissions of air pollutants from motor
vehicles if, in his judgment, those emissions “may reasonably be anticipated
to endanger public health or welfare.”7 The EPA concluded that it lacked
statutory authority over greenhouse gases and that even if it had such
authority, it would use its discretion and refuse to exercise it. Environmental
1

See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
16 U.S.C. § 1532 (1992).
3
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994).
4
515 U.S. at 708.
5
515 U.S. at 714.
6
Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (DC Cir 2005).
7
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000)
2
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groups and others challenged the EPA’s decision as inconsistent with the
underlying statute. The D.C Circuit rejected the challenge. Judge Randolph
wrote the opinion for the court, refusing to resolve the question of statutory
authority, but concluding that the EPA had properly exercised its discretion.
Judge Tatel dissented, emphasizing that the EPA had taken an unlawfully
“constricted view” of its statutory authority8 and that the agency had exercised
its discretion unlawfully.9

c. Under the administration of President Bill Clinton, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) asserted authority over tobacco and tobacco products.10
The governing statute allows the FDA to regulate “drugs” and “devices,” and
it defines “drugs” to include “articles (other than food) intended to affect the
structure or any function of the human body.”11 In the FDA’s view, nicotine
qualifies as a “drug.” Tobacco companies challenged the FDA’s assertion of
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court agreed, ruling that Congress had not
authorized the FDA to control tobacco and tobacco products and that the
agency’s initiative under President Clinton was therefore unlawful.12 Justice
Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg.13

My major goal here is to vindicate the law-interpreting authority of the executive
branch. This authority, I suggest, is indispensable to the healthy operation of modern
government. Indeed, the executive’s law-interpreting authority is a natural and proper
outgrowth of one of the most important legal developments of the twentieth century: the
shift from regulation through common law courts to regulation through administrative
agencies. In the modern era, statutory interpretation must often be undertaken, at least in
the first instance, by the President, the Department of Defense, the Environmental
8

415 F.3d at 62 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
Id.
10
FDA v. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
11
21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(c) (1996).
12
See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 161.
13
Id.
9

3
Protection Agency, the Federal Communications Commission, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the National Labor Relations
Board, the Department of Homeland Security, and countless other institutions within the
executive branch.14 Because the resolution of statutory ambiguities often calls for
assessments of both policy and principle, the key judgments are legitimately made by
executive officers, not courts.
In the three cases above, the relevant statutes were ambiguous, and statutory
interpretation was inevitably driven by some combination of political values and
assessments of disputed facts. In the first two, federal courts were correct to defer to the
executive; the Supreme Court should have deferred in the third as well. It should be no
surprise that when federal judges disagreed with one another in all three cases, the
disagreement operated along unmistakably political lines — splitting the stereotypically
liberal judges from the stereotypically conservative ones. There is no reason to believe
that in cases of this kind, the meaning of federal law should be settled by the inclinations
and predispositions of federal judges. The outcome should instead depend on the
commitments and beliefs of those who operate under the President.
The recognition of the executive’s interpretive power fits well with the
institutional judgments that are embodied in the post-New Deal willingness to embrace
presidential authority, including the countless forms of administrative power that are
exercised under the President. I shall suggest that recognition of the executive’s
interpretive power has the same relationship to the last half of the twentieth century what
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins15 had to the first: an institutional shift in interpretive
power brought about by a realistic understanding of what interpretation involves. In short,
Chevron is our Erie. When courts resolve genuine ambiguities, they cannot appeal to any
14

Throughout I shall treat the so-called independent agencies (such as the Federal Trade Commission, the
Federal Communications Commission, and the National Labor Relations Board) as within the executive
branch, even though the heads of such agencies are not at-will employees of the President. See Elena
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245. The key point is that the independent
agencies are subject to a range of presidential controls, so that their own judgments line up fairly well with
those of the President. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984). It is controversial to see independent agencies as
part of the executive branch, see id., but I believe that the analysis would be qualified, rather than
fundamentally different, if independent agencies were not so seen. Thus I shall use the terms “agencies”
and “executive branch” interchangeably, though readers should be aware that some agencies are not always
thought to be within that branch.
15
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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“brooding omnipresence in the sky”16; often they must rely on policy judgments of their
own. The meaning of statutory law should not depend on the policymaking discretion of
the judiciary.

2. Marbury, Counter-Marbury, and the New Deal
The grant of interpretive authority to the executive stems above all from a belief
that when statutory interpretation calls for political judgments, those judgments should be
made by those with a high degree of political accountability. If Congress has not settled a
particular question, the settlement should be made by responsive officials, rather than by
judges. The executive’s interpretive authority also rests on an understanding that the
resolution of ambiguities often requires specialized competence; here too the executive
should be preferred to the judiciary. Of course these claims must be qualified in various
ways.17 But they provide the right foundation for the allocation of interpretive authority.
To see why, it is necessary to explore Chevron itself.

What Chevron Said
The Administrative Procedure Act18 (APA), the basic charter governing
administrative agencies, was enacted in 1946. The governing provision of the APA says
that the “reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, [and] interpret
statutory provisions.”19 At first glance, this provision appears to reassert the
understanding, signaled by Marbury v. Madison,20 that questions of statutory
interpretation must be resolved by courts, not the executive.21 Many post-APA decisions
seemed to embrace this understanding.22 But there were important contrary indications, in

16

Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
See the discussion of nondelegation canons, below.
18
5 U.S.C. § § 551-559, 701-706 (2000 & Supp. II 2002)
19
Id. § 706 (2000).
20
5 U.S. 137 (1803).
21
See John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113 (1998).
22
See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944); FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981); NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 499 (1960); NLRB v. Highland
Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322 (1951); Office Employees Intl. Union v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957). For
recognition of the ambiguity of the cases, see Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35 (2d
Cir. 1976).
17
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which courts suggested that agency interpretations would be upheld so long as they were
rational.23
The law remained complex and confused until 1984, when the Court decided
Chevron.24 The Court’s ruling is difficult to understand without a sense of the context.
The case involved an ambitious effort by the EPA to increase private flexibility under the
Clean Air Act,25 in a way that presaged the substitution of economic incentives for
command-and-control

regulation.26

The

initiative

was

part

of

the

Reagan

Administration’s general effort to reduce regulatory burdens on the private sector.27 More
particularly, the EPA redefined “stationary source”28 under the Act so as to include an
entire factory, rather than each pollution-emitting unit within the plant. Responding to a
lower court invalidation of the new definition,29 the Supreme Court created a novel twostep inquiry for assessing agency decisions. The first inquiry is whether Congress has
directly decided the precise question at issue.30 If not, the second inquiry is whether the
agency’s decision is “permissible,” which is to say reasonable.31 In the court’s view,
Congress had not forbidden a plant-wide definition of “source,” and hence the EPA could
supply whatever (reasonable) definition it chose. Thus an inquiry into the two relevant
“steps” validated the EPA’s decision.32
Strikingly, the Court did not discuss the language or history of the APA. But it did
note that Congress sometimes explicitly delegates law-interpreting power to agencies.33
In the face of an explicit delegation of that power, courts would certainly defer. No one
doubts that Congress has the constitutional power to say that some statutory terms
(“source,” for example, or “take”34) may be defined by the executive.35 But the Court

23

See Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411 (1941); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). Ford Motor Co.
v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 440 U.S. 555, 565 (1980).
24
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
25
42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq (2000).
26
See A, DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR (2000).
27
See, e.g., Executive Order 12291.
28
42 U.S.C. § 7502(c).
29
NRDC v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
30
467 U.S. at 842–43.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
467 U.S. at 844.
34
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
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could not, and did not, contend that the relevant provision of the Clean Air Act contained
any explicit delegation. Hence the Court added that “sometimes the legislative delegation
to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit.”36 An implicit
delegation would give rise to deference as well. The Clean Air Act does give the EPA the
power to issue regulations; in granting that power, perhaps the Act is best taken to say
that the agency is implicitly entrusted with the interpretation of statutory terms. The
Court referred to this possibility, noting that Congress might have wanted the agency to
strike the relevant balance with the belief “that those with great expertise and charged
with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better position to do
so.”37 But lacking any evidence on the question, the Court did not insist that Congress in
fact so thought. It did not say that the power to issue regulations is best taken to signal a
delegation of law-interpreting power. On the contrary, it said that Congress’s particular
intention “matters not.”38
Instead the Court referred to two pragmatic points: judges lack expertise and they
are not politically accountable. In interpreting law, the agency may “properly rely upon
the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While
agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is.”39 The Court
was alert to the fact that it was reviewing a decision made by the Reagan Administration,
altering an interpretation by the Carter Administration; and to say the least, the Reagan
Administration had a self-conscious program for reorienting the administrative state.
Some of that program would inevitably be undertaken through fresh interpretations of
statutory terms. In the Court’s view, that was not objectionable. It would be appropriate
for agencies operating under the Chief Executive, rather than judges, to resolve
“competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or
intentionally left to be resolved in light of everyday realities.”40

35

In extreme cases, the power to interpret statutory terms might be taken to raise nondelegation problems;
but those problems are not an issue in the ordinary cases of explicit delegation to define terms. On
nondelegation issues and Chevron, see infra.
36
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
37
467 U.S. at 865.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
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What is most striking about this passage is the suggestion that resolution of
statutory ambiguities requires a judgment about resolving “competing interests.” This is a
candid recognition that assessments of policy are sometimes indispensable to statutory
interpretation. Of course we can imagine cases in which courts resolve ambiguities
through the standard sources — by, for example, using dictionaries, consulting statutory
structure, deploying canons of construction, or relying on legislative history if that
technique is thought to be legitimate.41 Under Chevron Step One, the executive will lose
if the standard sources show that the agency is wrong.42 But sometimes those sources will
leave gaps; Chevron itself is such a case, and there are many others. If the Court’s
analysis is accepted on this point, its deference principle seems inescapable.

Chevron’s Fiction: Delegation, Realism, and Institutional Competence
Fictions
In the years since Chevron, a consensus has developed on an important
proposition, one that now provides the foundation for Chevron itself: The executive’s
law-interpreting power turns on congressional will.43 If Congress wanted to repudiate
Chevron, it could do precisely that. Before Chevron, some courts appeared to understand
that the deference question was for congressional resolution; they approached the
deference question on a statute-by-statute basis, asking whether the relevant statute
should be taken to include an implicit delegation.44 In Chevron, the Court replaced that
case-by-case inquiry with a simple rule, to the effect that delegations of rulemaking
power implicitly include the power to interpret ambiguities.45 But as Justices Breyer and
Scalia have independently emphasized,46 this is a legal fiction; usually the legislature has
not expressly conferred that power at all. The view that the executive may “say what the
law is” results not from any reading of any statutory text, but from a heavily pragmatic

41

See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History, 65 SO. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992).
See, e.g., MCI Telecom. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
43
See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227–231 (2001).
44
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511.
45
Id.
46
Id.; Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986).
42
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construction of (nonexistent) congressional instructions. Any judgment about those
instructions is inevitably an ascription; it is not a matter of finding something.
In terms of the standard sources of law, Chevron’s fiction is not at all easy to
defend. As noted, the text of the APA appears to contemplate independent review of
judgments of law. The history supports the text. For example, Representative Walter,
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Administrative Law and author of the House
Committee Report on the bill, plainly said that the provision "requires courts to determine
independently all relevant questions of law, including the interpretation of constitutional
or statutory provisions."47 Hence the only possible justification for deference is that
certain grants of authority, in organic statutes, implicitly contain interpretive power as
well.48 But this argument also runs into difficulty. At the time the APA was enacted, the
bulk of important agency business was done via adjudication,49 and if Congress wanted
courts to defer to interpretations that were produced through adjudication, someone
would almost certainly have said so at some point in the extensive debates.50 The claim
that agency adjudicators (or rulemakers) have interpretive authority is certainly weakened
by the absence of any contemporaneous suggestions to that effect in Congress itself.
Perhaps subsequent grants of adjudicative or rulemaking power, as for example in
the Clean Air Act or the Endangered Species Act, are best taken to confer interpretive
power on the executive. But if this is so, the question must be explored on a case-by-case
basis, and it is likely that courts will be unable to find any clear expression of
congressional will — and hence we are back in the world of fictions.
To say that Chevron rests on a fiction, and one that does not clearly track
congressional instructions, is to acknowledge that the judicial judgment on the deference
question involves judicial policymaking — subject to legislative override, to be sure, but
not rooted in actual legislative judgments. I suggest that the Court’s allocation of
interpretive power to the executive should be seen as an outgrowth of two closely related
47

92 Cong. Rec. 5654 (1946) (statement of Rep. Walter), reprinted in APA Legislative History, (Sen. Doc).
See Scalia, supra note.
49
See Nathanson; STEPHEN BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY (5th ed.
2001).
50
For relevant discussion, see Duffy, supra note. Note also the Attorney General’s Manual, relied on by
Justice Scalia, supra note, is supportive of the deference principle. But in this context in particular, the
Attorney General’s Manual is unreliable, stating as it does the views of the executive branch, which would
naturally be inclined in favor of deference to its own views. See Duffy, supra note.
48
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developments. The first is the legal realist attack on the autonomy of legal reasoning. The
second is the twentieth century shift from regulation through common law courts to
regulation through executive agencies.

Realists and realism
The legal realists saw the interpretation of statutory ambiguities as necessarily
involving judgments of policy and principle.51 They insisted that when courts understand
statutes to mean one thing rather than another, they are inevitably using judgments of
their own, at least in genuinely hard cases. In the realist view, judicial judgments often
hide behind standard interpretive devices, such as legislative intent and canons of
construction, and these did not in fact motivate courts.
In a famous article, for example, Max Radin attacked the standard tools as largely
unhelpful. Canons of construction often have little “foundation in logic and in ordinary
habits of speech.”52 In his view, “A legislative intent, undiscoverable in fact, irrelevant if
it were discovered, . . . is a queerly amorphous piece of slag. Are we really reduced to
such shifts that we must fashion monsters and endow them with imaginations in order to
understand statutes?” 53 Nor is it helpful to rely on purpose, which can be characterized in
multiple different ways.54 In the end, a judge must be “impelled to make his selection . . .
by those psychical elements which him the kind of person that he is. That this is pure
subjectivism and therefore an unfortunate situation is beside the point.”55 Radin said that
a key question was inevitably: “Will the inclusion of this particular determinate in the
statutory determinable lead to a desirable result? What is desirable will be what is just,
what is proper, what satisfies the social emotions of the judge, what fits into the ideal
scheme of society which he entertains.”56
Radin’s argument was characteristic of the general period in which courts were
being displaced by regulatory agencies. A specialist in administrative law, Ernst Freund

51

See Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931).
Id. at 874.
53
Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870–72 (1930).
54
Id. at 876-77.
55
Id. at 881.
56
Radin, supra note, 884.
52
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saw that for some statutes, “executive interpretation is an important factor.”57 Freund
noted, with evident concern, that “in view of the inevitable ambiguities of language, a
power of interpretation is a controlling factor in the effect of legislative instruments, and
makes the courts that exercise it a rival with the legislature in the development of written
law.” 58 After surveying the various sources of interpretation, Freund said that “in cases
of genuine ambiguity courts should use the power of interpretation consciously and
deliberately to promote sound law and sound principles of legislation.”59 Freund added:

“That object is far more important than a painstaking fidelity to the
supposed legislative intent. This intent is in reality often a fiction, and the
legislature is fully aware that any but the most explicit language is subject
to the judicial power of interpretation. That power might, therefore, as
well be frankly and vigorously used as a legitimate instrument of legal
development and of balancing legislative inadvertence by judicial
deliberation.”60

For his part, Karl Llewellyn contended that the standard sources of interpretation,
above all the canons of construction, were a fraud, masking judgments that were really
based on other grounds.61 He asked courts to “strive to make sense as a whole out of our
law as a whole.”62 In his view, statutory meaning should be derived from "the good sense
of the situation and a simple construction of the available language to achieve that sense,
by tenable means, out of the statutory language."63
Radin, Llewellyn, and Freund undoubtedly overstated their arguments. Canons of
construction, for example, can discipline judicial (or executive) interpretation,64 and it
may well be better to rely on them than on a judge’s general sense of what is best. But

57

Id. at 211.
Ernst Freund, Interpretation of Statutes, 65 U. PA L. REV. 207, 208 (1917).
59
Id. at 231.
60
Id.
61
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules of Canons about How
Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 399 (1950) (emphasis in original).
62
Id. at 399 (emphasis in original).
63
Id. at 401.
64
See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997).
58
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suppose that the realists were broadly right to suggest that in the face of genuine
ambiguity, courts are often making judgments of policy,65 and that they should candidly
acknowledge that fact and try to “promote sound law and sound principles of legislation.”
Suppose that in hard cases, the search for “legislative intent” is often a fraud, and that
when courts speak for that intent, they are often speaking for their own preferred views.66
(I will offer evidence for that proposition below.67) If Radin, Llewellyn, and Freund are
indeed right, then there seems to be little reason to think that courts, rather the executive,
should be making those judgments. The President himself should be in a better position
to make the relevant judgments, simply because of his comparatively greater
accountability. And if specialized knowledge is required, executive agencies have large
advantages over generalist judges. Return to the question in Chevron itself. In the
abstract, it is difficult to know whether a plantwide definition of source will help or hurt
the environment; and the economic gains, if any, from the increased flexibility are not
easily assessed by federal judges. Consider also strong evidence that for hard statutory
questions within the Supreme Court, policy arguments of one or another sort often play a
central role, even in a period in which “textualism” has seemed on the ascendancy.68
We can even bring the realist view of interpretation in close contact with Ronald
Dworkin’s account of law as “integrity.”69 Of course Dworkin is no realist; his own view
of adjudication places a large emphasis on the constraints imposed by the existing legal
materials.70 Nonetheless, his account strongly supports the argument for executive
interpretation. Dworkin contends that interpretation, including statutory interpretation,71
requires a judgment about “fit” with existing materials and also about “justification” of
those materials; his conception of law as integrity requires judges to put existing
materials in their “best constructive light.”72 Where “fit” leaves more than one possibility,

65

See Jane Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1998).
66
Not incidentally, the question of deference to executive interpretations itself seems to fall in this
category; it is hard to tease out, from the existing legal materials, an authoritative legislative judgment on
that question, and hence it is necessary, as we have seen, to speak in terms of legal fictions.
67
See infra Part IV.
68
SeeSchacter, supra note 65.
69
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1985).
70
See id.
71
See id.
72
Id.
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judges have a degree of discretion. Everyone should agree that the executive, no less than
the judiciary, has a duty of “fit”; many of the hard cases arise when the key question is
which interpretation puts the law in its best constructive light.
But – and here is a question Dworkin does not ask -- why should courts be
entrusted with the duty to carry out that task? In modern government, courts are often less
capable on that count than is the executive, precisely because of its comparatively greater
expertise and accountability. In deciding how to understand the Endangered Species Act,
the Food and Drug Act, and the Clean Air Act, it would be puzzling to suggest that courts
are in a particularly good position to identify the “best constructive light.”

The New Deal and beyond
These points are easily linked with the post-New Deal transfer of effective
lawmaking power from common law courts to federal bureaucracies. For much of the
nation’s history, the basic rules of regulation were elaborated by common law courts,
using the principles of tort, contract, and property to set out the ground rules for social
and economic relationships. In the early part of the twentieth century, some of those rules
were taken to have constitutional status, so as to forbid legislative adjustments.73 In a
wholesale attack on the adequacy of the common law,74 the New Deal saw the rise and
legitimation of a vast array of new agencies, including the National Labor Relations
Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Administration, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, an expanded Federal Trade Commission, an
expanded Food and Drug Administration, and more.75 Many of the agencies were
necessarily in the business of interpreting ambiguous statutory provisions; indeed,
interpretation was a central part of their job. And there is a close link between the
realists’ emphasis on the policy-driven nature of interpretation and the New Deal’s
enthusiasm for expert administrators.76
The Marbury principle, calling for independent judicial judgments about law,
came under intense pressure as a result. After Roosevelt’s triumph in the Supreme Court
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in the late 1930s, courts started to signal that the executive would have considerable lawinterpreting power. A strong and representative statement came in 1941, when the Court
upheld a controversial interpretation by the Department of the Interior:

“Although we have here no dispute as to the evidentiary facts, that does
not permit a court to substitute its judgment for that of the Director. It is
not the province of a court to absorb the administrative functions to such
an extent that the executive or legislative agencies become mere
factfinding bodies deprived of the advantages of prompt and definite
action.”77

Two features of this passage are especially noteworthy. The first is the suggestion that
“administrative functions” include judgments of law. The second is the emphasis on the
need for “prompt and definite action” — an emphasis that is understandable on the heels
of Roosevelt’s effort to take bold action in the face of the Great Depression.78
Or consider this passage, written in the same year, from the Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure79:

“Even on questions of law [independent judicial] judgment seems not to
be compelled. The question of statutory interpretation might be
approached by the court de novo and given the answer which the court
thinks to be the ‘right interpretation.’ Or the court might approach it,
somewhat as a question of fact, to ascertain, not the ‘right interpretation,’
but only whether the administrative interpretation has substantial support.
Certain standards of interpretation guide in that direction. Thus, where the
statute is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court
may accept that of the administrative body. Again, the administrative
interpretation is to be given weight — not merely as the opinion of some
men or even of a lower tribunal, but as the opinion of the body especially
77
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familiar with the problems dealt with by the statute and burdened with the
duty of enforcing it. This may be legislation that deals with complex
matters calling for expert knowledge and judgment.”

It is in this light that a recognition of the executive’s law-interpreting power can
be understood as a natural outgrowth of the twentieth-century shift from judicial to
executive branch lawmaking.80 The replacement has been spurred by dual commitments
to specialized competence and democratic accountability — and also by an understanding
of the need for frequent shifts in policy over time, with new understandings of fact and
with new values as well. For banking, telecommunications, foreign relations, and
environmental protection — among many other areas — changing circumstances often
require agencies to adapt old provisions to unanticipated problems. And if interpretation
of unclear terms cannot operate without some judgments of the interpreter’s own, then
the argument for executive interpretation seems overwhelming.

Vacillations and counterarguments
The period between 1940 and 1984 offered a mixed picture on the deference
question. In a number of cases, the Court seemed to indicate that it would take a firm
hand.81 The rise of the “hard look doctrine” in the 1970s, spurred by judicial distrust of
agency discretion, could not easily coexist with deference to agency interpretations of
law.82 A key development was the new administration of President Reagan, which in
relevant ways replicated that of President Roosevelt.83 In both cases, the executive branch
was attempting to reorient the law in significant respects, with large-scale rethinking of
the approach offered by its predecessor. It should come as no surprise that in the same
period that the President was attempting such rethinking, the Supreme Court firmly
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endorsed the law-interpreting power of the executive branch. At the time the Court itself
may have had limited ambitions for its decision,84 but Chevron was soon viewed as a
kind of revolution, a counter-Marbury for the modern era85 — or even as a McCulloch v
Maryland,86 granting the executive broad discretion to choose its own preferred means to
promote statutory ends.
We can now summarize the discussion in order to venture a simple account of
Chevron’s understanding of (implicit, fictional) legislative instructions. First,
interpretation of statutes often calls for technical expertise, and here the executive has
conspicuous advantages over the courts. Second, interpretation of statutes often calls for
political accountability, and the executive has conspicuous advantages on that count as
well. Third, the executive administers laws that apply over extended periods and across
heterogeneous contexts. Changes in both facts and values argue strongly for considerable
executive power in interpretation. Courts are far too cumbersome and too decentralized to
do enough “updating,” or to adapt statutes to diverse domains. Fourth, it is often
important to permit the modern state to act promptly and decisively. Deference to
executive interpretations promotes that goal far better than a strong judicial role, and for
two different reasons. It reduces the likelihood that judicial disagreement will result in
time-consuming remands to the agency for further proceedings.87 More subtly, it combats
the risk that different lower courts will disagree about the appropriate interpretation of
statutes — and thus works to counteract the balkinization of federal law.88 These ideas
help to account for Chevron’s legal fiction, which is that Congress has delegated lawinterpreting power to the executive.
Of course there are plausible counterarguments. The foundations of Chevron,
understood in the terms I have sketched, are intensely pragmatic, and a challenge might
be mounted on pragmatic grounds. Suppose that we believe that executive agencies do
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not usually deploy technical expertise in a way that is properly disciplined by political
accountability. Suppose we think that such agencies are largely controlled by wellorganized private groups hoping to redistribute wealth or opportunities in their favor.89 If
claims of agency “capture” are valid, deference to the executive might seem perverse.
And if agencies are thought to be systematically biased, then the argument for
independent judicial judgments on questions of law will seem much stronger.90
We can easily imagine a parallel world, perhaps not so very different from our
own, in which there is a high risk of unreliable or biased interpretations from the
executive branch; perhaps courts can be trusted by comparison. In that parallel world,
Chevron would be written very differently, and independent judicial interpretation would
be the norm. And if some agencies are different from others, perhaps a single deference
rule makes no sense. It might be tempting to distinguish between those decisions, and
those agencies, that are attributable to the views of high-level officials or those with
technical expertise, and those decisions that involve low-visibility judgments that do not
require, or do not benefit from, such expertise. Perhaps the rule of deference should, and
does, reflect an understanding of contextual differences.
There is a further point. Political accountability and technical expertise are both
important, but they might not march hand-in-hand. Perhaps politically accountable actors
are not much interested in technical expertise; often they have agendas of their own.91 If
the displacement of common law courts by regulatory agencies is seen as an effort to
ensure that judgments are made by specialists rather than generalists, then a strong
judicial hand might, on occasion, be necessary to vindicate specialization against politics.
Few institutional judgments can be defended in the abstract. If agencies are
systematically biased, independent judicial review of legal judgments is certainly easier
to defend. In practice, Chevron is not uniformly applied, and courts trust some agencies
more than others; but it would be extremely difficult to alter the formal doctrine in a way
that recognized such differences. Notwithstanding the counterarguments, the general
argument for judicial deference to executive interpretations of law remains sound; it rests
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on the undeniable claim that specialized competence is often highly relevant and that
political accountability plays a legitimate role in the choice of one or another approach. If
the executive’s judgment ignores relevant facts, then the proper approach is not to
abandon Chevron, but to invalidate that judgment under Chevron Step 2 or as unlawfully
arbitrary.92 A central goal of Chevron is to ensure that within the realm of reasonableness,
the key judgments are made by policymaking officials, not by those with strictly legal
competence. Of course those officials are fallible; but in a democratic society, that goal is
worth pursuing.

3. Does Chevron Matter?
Does Chevron matter? At first glance, we would predict, with some confidence,
that the decision would produce a significant increase in judicial validations of
regulations. Giving the benefit of the doubt to agencies, courts would be expected to
uphold agency action that would be struck down if courts were interpreting the law on
their own. But a skeptic, or a dedicated realist, might believe that the judicial rules
governing deference would not have much of an effect, and that judicial policy
preferences would in the end turn out to be determinative.

Schuck and Elliott
An early study attempts to measure the effect of Chevron by examining
affirmance rates in different periods. Schuck and Elliott find a statistically significant
increase in validation rates in the immediate aftermath of Chevron. In particular, they
find an increase in affirmance rates from 71% in the pre-Chevron year of 1984 to 81% in
the post-Chevron year of 1985.93 They also find a dramatic decrease in judicial remands
on the ground that agencies erred on the law.94 The combination of a higher rate of
affirmance with a lower rate of remands for errors of law strongly suggests that Chevron
had a significant impact.95
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We must be careful, however, with findings of this sort. First, it might well be
expected that panel composition would matter as much as or more than Chevron itself.
We might hypothesize, for example, that a panel of three Republican appointees would
uphold agency action under President Reagan, whatever the formal doctrine — and that a
panel of three Democratic appointees would be far less likely to do so, even with a strong
deference signal from the Supreme Court.96 A realist perspective on the application of
Chevron would speculate that the formal deference rules could be dwarfed by political
inclinations. A shift in the direction of greater deference might suggest, not that the
deference rule matters, but that Republican appointees are deferring to a Republican
president. This point matters because Schuck and Elliott did not control for panel
composition. Perhaps the higher deference rates, in 1985, were a product of a greater
percentage of Republican appointees, rather than Chevron itself. I will return to this point
below.
Second, litigants should be expected to adjust their behavior to a post-Chevron
world. Suppose that Chevron does make it more difficult to convince a court that an
agency violated the law. If this is so, then litigants will not bring the cases they would
have brought, and their success rate will change accordingly. This possibility suggests a
hypothesis: The rate of judicial validations of agency interpretations of law should remain
fairly constant over time, as litigants adjust their claims to the prevailing deference
principles. But there is a countervailing factor: After Chevron, agencies might be willing
to defend interpretations that they would not have made in a pre-Chevron world. As a
result of this factor too, it might be expected that the rate of validation will remain
constant. The general point is that because the mix of cases will shift, the world cannot be
held constant for a test of Chevron’s effect. Even without an increase in deference rates,
Chevron might have had a large effect, simply because different cases are being litigated;
the margin along which challenges occur might have shifted. A comparison between
1984 and 1985 helpfully concentrates attention on the year immediately after Chevron,
when litigants may not have fully adjusted to the new regime. But it is hard to draw largescale inferences from the limited data.
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Schuck and Elliott are entirely aware of this general point, and hence they
attempted to study federal appeals decisions for a two-month period in March and April
1988. Examining 151 cases, they found an affirmance rate of 75%, closer to the preChevron year of 1984 than to the post-Chevron year of 1985.97 Perhaps this figure
suggests that Chevron had a less substantial effect than the 1985 data indicate. But it is
hard to know how to evaluate the relevant numbers, reflecting as they might a shift in the
nature of the cases that were reaching the courts of appeals.

Merrill
Thomas Merrill offers an interesting before-and-after picture of Supreme Court
decisions involving deference to executive agencies.98 In the three-year period before
Chevron, the Court decided forty-five cases on the deference question, accepting the
agency’s view 75% of the time. In the seven-year period after Chevron, the Court decided
ninety cases on that question, accepting the agency’s view 70% of the time. Merrill
concludes that Chevron did not produce an increase in the level of deference to agency
decisions.
That conclusion does not, however, follow from his data.99 Here as well, litigants
on both sides might have adjusted their behavior in accordance with Chevron, and hence
the world cannot be held constant between 1981 and 1990. Other variables might also
account for the shift, including changes in the substantive areas with which the Supreme
Court was confronted.

Point Estimates v. Policy Space: A Glimpse from the Trenches
E. Donald Elliott, a former General Counsel of the EPA, has offered an informal
but illuminating account of the impact of Chevron, one that strongly supports the
argument I have sketched on behalf of deference to the executive.100 Elliott reports that
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Chevron “change[d] the way that we did business.”101 Before Chevron, the Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC) within EPA usually assumed that a statute was “a prescriptive text
having a single meaning, discoverable by specialized legal training and tools.”102 In
Elliott’s view, the single meaning approach created a special role for lawyers, one that
“led to a great deal of implicit policy-making.”103 But post-Chevron, lawyers within the
EPA offered no single point estimate. Instead they “attempt[ed] to describe a permissible
range of agency policy-making discretion that arises out of a statutory ambiguity.”104 The
result is not a single meaning but a "policy space,"105 containing a range of permissible
interpretive discretion. It follows that the “agency's policy-makers, not its lawyers, should
decide which of several different but legally defensible interpretations to adopt.”106
In Elliott’s account, “Chevron opened up and validated a policy-making dialogue
within agencies about what interpretation the agency should adopt for policy reasons,
rather than what interpretation the agency must adopt for legal reasons.”107 The result has
been to “increase[] the weight given to the views of air pollution experts in the air
program office relative to the lawyers.”108 At the same time, there has been a shift from
an emphasis on legal texts to an emphasis on consequences. “Chevron moved the debate
from a sterile, backward-looking conversation about Congress' nebulous and fictive intent
to a forward-looking, instrumental dialogue about what future effects the proposed policy
is likely to have.”109 In short, “Chevron is significant for reducing the relative power of
lawyers within EPA and other agencies and for increasing the power of other
professionals.”110
This account strongly supports the general justification that I am attempting to
offer here. The precise point of Chevron is to acknowledge that in the face of ambiguity,
the key questions are not for those with legal training, but instead for other professionals.
We do not know enough to know whether the shift that Elliott describes has also occurred
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within other agencies. But if the FCC is deciding whether or how to engage in
deregulation, if the President is deciding how to implement an authorization to use force
in response to the attacks of September 11,111 and if the Department of the Interior is
deciding on the reach of the Endangered Species Act,112 there is every reason to think that
the job of lawyers, and of reviewing courts, is to identify policy spaces, not to insist on
point estimates.

Republican and Democratic appointees, and beyond
Let us return to data and explore the results of a study, conducted by Thomas
Miles and me, of judicial behavior in Chevron cases.113 The central goal of the study is to
see whether political affiliation, or political convictions, play a role in judicial review of
agency interpretations of law.
On the lower courts, the study involves all published court of appeals decisions
between 1990 and the present, reviewing interpretations of law by the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Federal Communications Commission, and the National Labor
Relations Board. Decisions are generally coded as "liberal" if the agency decision is
upheld against industry attack; decisions are also generally coded as liberal if the agency
decision is invalidated as a result of an attack by a public interest group. Here are the
principal findings:
1. Republican appointees show significantly more conservative voting patterns
than Democratic appointees. The former provide “liberal” votes 49% of the time; the
latter provide such votes 60% of the time.114
2. When Republican appointees sit only with Republican appointees, and when
Democratic appointees sit only with Democratic appointees, the gap grows – to 28%.
Republican appointees show far more conservative voting patterns (43% liberal votes)
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when sitting only with other Republican appointees; the same is even more true for
Democratic appointees on the liberal side (70% liberal votes).115
3. Republican appointees are more likely to uphold the interpretations of
Republican presidents than those of Democratic presidents. Democratic appointees are
more likely to uphold the interpretations of Democratic presidents than those of
Republican presidents.116

What about the Supreme Court? Here the study investigates the votes of the
individual justices between 1990 and the present in all clear Chevron cases -- that is, in
all cases in which the Court applies the Chevron framework. These are the main results:
1. Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Rehnquist show significantly higher deference
rates under the Bush Administration than under the Clinton Administration. Justices
Souter, Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsburg show higher deference rates under the Clinton
Administration than under the Bush Administration.117 (The change in the latter group is
13%, smaller than the 18% increase shown by the former group.)
2. If decisions are coded in political terms, Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Rehnquist show the most conservative voting patterns in Chevron cases, while Justices
Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg show the most liberal.118 This finding is
noteworthy because Chevron requires courts to defer to agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes; for that reason, it might be anticipated to ensure that judicial votes,
reviewing agency interpretations of law, do not fall along the expected ideological lines.
3. When a justice is voting to reverse an agency’s decision under Chevron, what is
the likelihood that the agency’s decision will be liberal? For the Souter, Stevens, Breyer,
and Ginsburg group, the likelihood is 33%; for the Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas group,
the likelihood is 62%.119
These findings present many questions, and this is not the space to explore them
in detail.120 The most general conclusion is that even under Chevron, the political
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commitments of reviewing judges continue to play a significant role in the decision
whether to uphold decisions by the executive branch. For courts of appeals, the difference
between Republican and Democratic appointees is smaller than it is on the Supreme
Court, which decides the hardest cases; but the difference remains substantial. At first
glance, this evidence fortifies the argument for a strong reading of Chevron. There is no
reason to think that where statutes are ambiguous, their meaning should depend on the
composition of the panel that litigants draw.

4. Marbury’s Revenge?
Since 1984, there have been serious attacks on the idea that the executive has the
power to say what the law is. Many observers have feared that this idea ultimately
compromises the rule of law, by allowing a combination of executive and adjudicatory
authority in a way that eliminates an independent judicial check.121 In the last twenty
years, efforts to cabin the executive’s power have taken several forms. I outline the
principal efforts here and explain why they should be rejected. The underlying point is
that those who seek an independent judicial check would, in reality, increase the
likelihood that judgments of policy would be made by federal judges, not by Congress.
Pure Questions of Law
In one of the most important pre-Chevron cases, the Court seemed to distinguish
between purely legal questions, to be resolved by judges, and applications of law to fact,
for which deference would be appropriate.122
The key case was INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca.123 At issue was a statutory provision
permitting the Attorney General to deny asylum to an alien who wishes to stay in the
United States “because of . . . a well-founded fear of persecution” in his home country.
The INS interpreted “well-founded fear” to require persecution to be “more likely than
not.” On this view, a good-faith subjective belief, based on evidence, would not be
enough; a 51% probability of persecution was necessary. The Court struck down the
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agency’s interpretation, emphasizing the text, structure, and history of the statute. But the
Court added that the issue in the case involves “a pure question of statutory construction
for the courts to decide.”124 That question “is, of course, quite different from the question
of interpretation that arises in each case in which the agency is required to apply” a
standard “to a particular set of facts.”125 In applying law to fact through case-by-case
decisions, agencies would receive judicial respect. But the interpretive issue in CardozaFonseca “is well within the province of the judiciary.”126
Taken on its face, Cardoza-Fonseca seems to be an effort to restore the preChevron status quo, by asserting the primacy of the judiciary on any “pure question of
statutory construction.” And in fact, Justice Scalia saw Justice Stevens’ opinion in exactly
that way. In his concurrence, he said that the Court’s “discussion is flatly inconsistent”
with the view that Chevron established “that courts must give effect to a reasonable
agency interpretation of a statute unless that interpretation is inconsistent with a clearly
expressed congressional intent.”127 On pure questions of law, no less than on mixed
questions, Justice Scalia contended that deference was the appropriate approach.
On this count Justice Scalia was clearly correct. Suppose that the statute in
Cardoza-Fonseca was genuinely ambiguous – that an investigation of the standard legal
sources did not say whether Congress meant to forbid the INS from adopting a “more
probable than not” standard. In that event, judicial deference would be appropriate,
however “pure” the legal question. By hypothesis, the ambiguity is genuine, and hence a
judgment of policy is involved (in a particularly sensitive area). The key point is that
even when purely legal questions are raised, purely legal competence may not be enough
to resolve them. Chevron itself is an example. The definition of “source” did not involve
the application of law to fact, and nonetheless the Court deferred to the EPA’s view.
Justice Scalia’s concurrence has triumphed, in the sense that there is no separate
category of cases involving purely legal questions. The distinction drawn in CardozaFonseca has failed to appear in subsequent cases.
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Jurisdiction
Does Chevron apply to jurisdictional disputes? The Supreme Court has divided on
the question,128 which remains unsettled in the lower courts.129 If courts are entitled
to make independent judgments about jurisdictional issues, the executive would be
deprived of law-interpreting power in many of the areas in which it would most like to
have that power. It can be contested whether an exception for jurisdictional questions
would arise in many cases; but the importance of such an exception would be
incontestable. This, then, is a second route by which Chevron’s reach might be cabined.
In the abstract, there are plausible arguments on both sides. Recall that Chevron is
rooted in a theory of implied delegation, and it is reasonable to think that Congress
should not be taken to have delegated to agencies the power to decide on the scope of
their own authority. That question, it might be thought, ought to be answered by an
independent institution, not by the agency itself. If foxes ought not to guard henhouses,
then perhaps agencies should not be understood to have power to assess the reach of their
own authority. For this reason, Justice Brennan argued that judgments about jurisdiction
“have not been entrusted to the agency” and might well “conflict with the agency's
institutional interests in expanding its own power.”130
On the other hand, any exemption of jurisdictional questions is vulnerable on two
grounds. First, the line between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional questions is far from
clear, and hence any exemption threatens to introduce much more complexity into the
inquiry into the deference question. With this point in mind, Justice Scalia argued that
“there is no discernible line between an agency's exceeding its authority and an agency's
exceeding authorized application of its authority.”131 Second, and far more
fundamentally, the considerations that underlie Chevron might well support, rather than
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undermine, its application to jurisdictional questions. If an agency is asserting or denying
jurisdiction over some area, it is either because democratic forces are leading it to do so
or because its own specialized competence justifies its jurisdictional decision.
To be sure, an assertion of jurisdiction is an expansion of authority, but in the
abstract, a refusal to exercise that authority may be troubling as well. In the face of
ambiguity with respect to jurisdiction, the executive, and not the judiciary, should make
the underlying judgments of policy and principle.

Major Questions
Although debate continues over the executive’s authority to decide jurisdictional
questions, the Court has recently raised a closely related question: whether Chevron
applies to “major” questions. This issue was initially signaled in 1986 in a short essay by
then-Judge Breyer, who suggested that Chevron should be read not to establish a simple
rule, but instead to provide the foundation for a more particularistic inquiry into
Congress’ likely instructions on the deference issue.132 In his view, the inference would
rest on an inquiry into “what a sensible legislator would have expected given the statutory
circumstances.”133 The expectations of the sensible legislator would depend on an inquiry
into institutional competence:

“The less important the question of law, the more interstitial its character, the
more closely related to the everyday administration of the statute and to the
agency's (rather than the court's) administrative or substantive expertise, the
less likely it is that Congress (would have) ‘wished’ or ‘expected’ the courts
to remain indifferent to the agency's views. Conversely, the larger the
question, the more its answer is likely to clarify or stabilize a broad area of
law, the more likely Congress intended the courts to decide the question
themselves.”134
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For present purposes, the key distinction is between “less important” and “more
interstitial” questions on the one hand and “larger” questions on the other. Justice
Breyer’s apparent suggestion is that for the latter, an independent judicial hand is
desirable.
The Court as a whole signaled a strong interest in this distinction in FDA v.
Brown & Williamson,135 the tobacco case with which I began. Recall that the statutory
language appeared ambiguous on the question, for it defined drug to include “articles
(other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body.”136 Under
this language and with the assistance of Chevron, the FDA contended, with considerable
force, that it could assert authority over tobacco. But the Court rejected its analysis
through a complicated route. Much of its opinion emphasized the wide range of tobaccospecific legislation enacted by Congress in the last decades — legislation that, in the
Court’s view, should “preclude an interpretation of the FDCA that grants the FDA
authority to regulate tobacco products.”137 But the Court added a closing word. It said
that its inquiry into the Chevron question “is shaped, at least in some measure, by the
nature of the question presented.”138 Chevron, the Court noted, is based on “an implicit
delegation,” but in “extraordinary cases,” courts should “hesitate before concluding that
Congress has intended such an implicit delegation.”139 The Court cited no case for this
key proposition, but instead referred to the 1986 essay by then-Judge Breyer,
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encapsulating one of his central arguments, that there is a difference between “major
questions,” on which “Congress is more likely to have focused,” and “interstitial
matters.” At that point the Court added, “we are confident that Congress could not have
intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political significance to an agency
in so cryptic a fashion.”141
How should this passage be read? It would be plausible to say that for decisions
of great “economic and political significance,” an implicit delegation ought not to be
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found. And if an exception exists for major questions, then the executive’s power of
interpretation faces a large limitation. And indeed, the EPA has seized on Brown &
Williamson in contending that it lacks the power to regulate greenhouse gases.142
The brief passage in Brown & Williamson could be invoked in many contexts, limiting
Chevron to “interstitial” questions, as Justice Breyer would apparently prefer. The
problem is that there is no good justification for the conclusion that major questions
should be resolved judicially rather than administratively. To say the least, no simple line
separates interstitial and major questions; and an insistence on that line would raise
doubts about an array of decisions, including Chevron itself. In any case expertise and
accountability, the linchpins of Chevron’s legal fiction, are highly relevant to the
resolution of major questions.
Assume, for example, that the statutes in Brown & Williamson were genuinely
ambiguous — that the relevant sources of interpretation could plausibly be read to
support or to forbid the agency action at issue. If so, the argument for judicial deference
would be exceptionally strong. In Brown & Williamson, the FDA was taking action to
reduce one of the nation’s most serious public health problems, in a judgment that had a
high degree of public visibility and required immersion in the subject at hand. Perhaps
Congress could not easily be taken to delegate the resolution of these questions to
administrative agencies. But would it really be better to understand Congress to have
delegated the resolution of those questions to federal courts? Which federal courts?
Nominated by which president?
A different version of the “major questions” exception would have greater appeal.
Suppose it is thought that agencies should not be allowed to move the law in new
directions without congressional approval. On this view, courts would not be displacing
policy decisions by the executive branch. They would be attempting to block the
executive from initiating massive changes without clear legislative authorization. Perhaps
Brown & Williamson can be understood in these terms.143 This claim is on the right track
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insofar as it emphasizes the relevance of nondelegation concerns to application of the
Chevron framework.144 But it runs into two problems. First, the distinction between
“major” changes and less major ones remains ambiguous; consider Chevron itself.
Second, it is legitimate for the executive to make “major” changes insofar as it is doing
so through reasonable interpretation of genuinely ambiguous statutes. The best use of
nondelegation concerns lies elsewhere, as we shall shortly see.
Chevron Step Zero
In recent years, the most active debates over the executive’s power to interpret the
law have involved “Chevron Step Zero” – the threshold inquiry into whether the
executive’s law-interpreting power exists at all.145 The Step Zero inquiry has produced a
great deal of confusion and complexity, defying the hopes of those who hoped that
Chevron would simplify the law.146
The key case is United States v. Mead Corporation.147 The question was the legal
status of a tariff clarification ruling by the United States Customs Service. Was such a
ruling entitled to Chevron deference? The Court concluded that it was not, distinguishing
between Chevron cases, subject to the two-step framework, and other kinds of cases, in
which the agency’s decision would be consulted but would not receive deference at all.148
The Court’s central suggestion is that Chevron applies “when it appears that Congress
has delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law,
and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of
that authority.”149 An implicit delegation of interpretive authority would be apparent if
Congress “would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law.”150
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In the Court’s view, a “very good indicator of delegation” is authorization “to
engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings
for which deference is claimed.”151 If agencies have been given power to use relatively
formal procedures, and if they have exercised that power, they are entitled to Chevron
deference. Nonetheless, Chevron deference can be found, and has sometimes been found,
“even when no such administrative formality was required and none was afforded.”152
Why, then, was the tariff ruling in Mead not entitled to deference? A relevant factor was
that formal procedures were not involved. Another was that nearly fifty customs offices
issue tariff classifications, producing 10,000 to 15,000 annually. “Any suggestion that
rulings intended to have the force of law are being churned out at a rate of 10,000 a year
at an agency’s 46 scattered offices is simply self-refuting.”153
What is motivating the Court to restrict Chevron’s domain? The Court’s own
rationale speaks of the absence of a congressional delegation of law-interpreting power.
Perhaps there has been no delegation in cases in which Chevron has been held not to
apply. But recall that we are speaking here of fictions, not of actual congressional
instructions. Why is the refusal to defer to the executive the most sensible fiction? The
Court must be thinking that if an agency is not operating pursuant to formal procedures, it
is not entitled to deference, because the absence of such procedures signals a lack of
accountability and a risk of arbitrariness.

Perhaps formal procedures increase the

likelihood that expertise will be properly applied; perhaps they also ensure political
constraints on agency discretion.
These suggestions are understandable, but there are two problems with the
resulting state of affairs. The first involves the burdens of decision. To say the least, it is
unfortunate if litigants and courts have to work extremely hard to know whether a
decision by the executive is entitled to deference. The second problem involves
institutional comparisons. Even when an agency’s decision is not preceded by formal
procedures, there is no reason to think that courts are in a better position than agencies to
resolve statutory ambiguities. For the future, Mead should not be taken to establish
anything like a presumption against judicial deference when the agency has not
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proceeded through formal procedures. Instead it should be seen as an unusual case in an
exceedingly unusual setting, in which low-level administrators were required to produce
thousands of rulings.
A narrow understanding of Mead would continue to allow deference to be applied
to many agency decisions not preceded by formal procedures.154 Most important, that
narrow understanding would suggest that the President himself is entitled to deference in
his interpretations of law, even if he has not proceeded through formal procedures. When
Congress delegates authority to the President, it ought to be presumed to have entitled
him to construe ambiguities as he sees fit, subject to the general requirement of
reasonableness.155

Canons Against Chevron
My general argument has been in favor of an expansive view of the executive’s
power to interpret the law. But there is one area in which that power is limited. The area
involves interpretive principles that require Congress to decide certain issues explicitly.
In that area, an exception to the Chevron principle, calling for invalidation of agency
decisions at Step One, is entirely appropriate.
It is familiar to hear the idea that Congress must speak with clarity, most
obviously in connection with the nondelegation doctrine156; and in fact, my argument on
behalf of judicial deference to executive interpretations of law might seem to be in
tension with that doctrine. On one view, Article I forbids Congress from “delegating” its
power to anyone else, and open-ended grants of authority are unconstitutional. While the
Supreme Court has not used the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate a federal statute
since in 1935, 157 the Court continues to pay lip service to the doctrine, and to hold it in
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reserve for extreme cases.158 Why has the Court been so reluctant to use the doctrine to
strike down statutes? One reason is that the idea of nondelegation is difficult to enforce,
requiring as it does difficult judgments of degree.159 There are also questions about the
constitutional pedigree of the doctrine, and about whether it would make American
government work better or worse.160
At most, the nondelegation doctrine now operates as a tool of statutory
construction, suggesting a presumption in favor of narrow rather than open-ended grants
of authority.161 Perhaps Chevron is objectionable on nondelegation grounds, because it
grants the executive the authority to interpret the very statutes that limit its power.162 But
there is a serious problem with this objection. If the executive is denied interpretive
authority, that authority is given to the judiciary instead, and it is not clear that any
nondelegation concern is reduced as a result. On the contrary, an allocation of
policymaking authority to the executive seems to reduce that concern, precisely because
the executive has a measure of accountability.163
Nonetheless, there is a set of cases in which courts have denied the executive lawinterpreting authority on the ground that the key decisions must be explicitly made by the
national lawmaker. The most important idea here is that the executive is not permitted to
construe statutes so as to raise serious constitutional doubts.164 Note that this principle is
far more ambitious than the modest claim that a statute will be construed so as to be
constitutional rather than unconstitutional (thus forbidding the executive to adopt
unconstitutional interpretations). Under the idea that I am describing, the executive is
forbidden to adopt interpretations that are constitutionally sensitive, even if those
interpretations might ultimately be upheld. The only limitations on the principle are that
the constitutional doubts must be serious and substantial, and that the statute must be
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fairly capable of an interpretation contrary to the agency’s own.165 So long as the statute
is unclear, and the constitutional question serious, Congress must decide to raise that
question via explicit statement.
Why does this idea overcome the executive’ s usual power of interpretation? The
reason is that we are speaking of a kind of nondelegation canon – one that attempts to
require Congress to make its instructions exceedingly clear, and that does not permit the
executive to make constitutionally sensitive decisions on its own.166 For example, a court
of appeals invalidated a Federal Election Commission rule that interpreted the governing
statute so as to allow it to make a public release of the files of a completed
investigation.167 The court acknowledged that the statute was ambiguous, but said the
agency’s interpretation was unreasonable because it would create first amendment
difficulties.
Other interpretive principles, also serving as nondelegation canons, trump
Chevron as well. One of the most fundamental forbids the executive to apply statutes
outside of the territorial borders of the United States.168 The central notion here is that
extraterritorial application calls for extremely sensitive judgments involving international
relations; such judgments must be made via the ordinary lawmaking process (in which
the President of course participates). The executive may not make this decision on its
own.169 Consider also the notion that unless Congress has spoken with clarity, the
executive is not allowed to apply statutes retroactively, even if the relevant terms are
quite unclear.170 Retroactivity is disfavored in the law,171 and Congress will not be taken
to have delegated to the executive the authority to choose to apply statutes retroactively.
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One of the most general nondelegation canons is the rule of lenity, which says
that in the face of ambiguity, criminal statutes will be construed favorably to criminal
defendants.172 Criminal law must be a product of a clear judgment on Congress’s part.
Where no clear judgment has been made, the statute will not apply merely because it is
plausibly interpreted, by courts or enforcement authorities, to fit the case at hand. For
broadly related reasons, the executive cannot interpret statutes and treaties unfavorably
to Native Americans.173 Where statutory provisions are ambiguous, the government will
not prevail. This idea is plainly an outgrowth of the complex history of relations between
the United States and Native American tribes, which have semi-sovereign status; it is an
effort to ensure that any unfavorable outcome will be a product of an explicit judgment
from the national legislature. The institutional checks created by congressional structure
must be navigated before an adverse decision may be made. There are many other
examples.174 In many areas, ranging from broadcasting to the war on terror,175 the
nondelegation canons operate as constraints on the interpretive discretion of the
executive.
What emerges is therefore a simple structure. In general, the executive is
permitted to interpret ambiguous statutes as it sees fit, subject to the constraints of
reasonableness. The only limitations can be found in the nondelegation canons. The
resulting framework is admirably well-suited to the needs of modern government; it
grants the executive the same degree of discretion that it deserves to have.
4. Conclusion
Chevron is best taken as a vindication of the realist claim that resolution of
statutory ambiguities often calls for judgments of policy and principle. Indeed, that claim
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is on the surface of the Court’s opinion, with its suggestion that judgments about
ambiguities call for an assessment of “competing interests.” The allocation of lawinterpreting power to the executive fits admirably well with the twentieth-century shift
from common law courts to regulatory administration. Of course the executive must
follow the law when it is clear, and agency decisions are invalid if they are genuinely
arbitrary. But if a governing statute is ambiguous, the executive should usually be
permitted to interpret it as it sees fit.
Unfortunately, courts have occasionally attempted to reassert their primacy in the
interpretation of statutory law. These efforts should be resisted. The only qualification –
narrow but exceedingly important -- involves domains in which Congress must explicitly
provide explicit authorization to executive officials. In those domains, statutory
ambiguity is not enough, and the executive branch is not permitted to act on its own.

